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Securitize Me: Stimulating Renewable Energy Financing
by Embracing the Capital Markets
ANDREW C. FINK*
The current system of financing renewable energy projects is broken and
inadequate, especially when compared to the framework for participating in
oil and gas ventures. The solution lies in borrowing accepted energy
business practices and adapting them to solar and wind energy projects.
This Article focuses on the current issues facing renewable energy project
financing in the United States, analyzes failed attempts to stimulate growth,
and presents the securitization of renewable energy assets as a solution.
Drawing on current legal structure and debates from the corporate sphere,
this Article also discusses specific securitization techniques that can help to
democratize and grow investment in renewable energy projects.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has designed a renewable energy incentive system that
emphasizes tax equity financing as a stimulator for private renewable energy
financing. A tax-based incentive structure, however, is too small and narrow
to accommodate the necessary scale of development needed to transition the
U.S. from a fossil fuel-dependent country to a renewable energy independent
nation. The current framework is unreliable and poorly designed, resulting in
renewable energy projects that are severely handicapped when competing
against their fossil fuel counterparts. While the recent financial crisis has
given securitization a poor public reputation, this tool, once a financial
innovation and now often a mainstream industry practice, can keep costs of
renewable project financing low and permit renewable output to compete on
a level playing field with other types of energy.
In this Article, I argue that legislators should recognize the
comparatively thin subsidies they have provided to the renewable energy
industry and stop wasting their efforts with short-term tax credit
commitments. Instead, legislators should pursue a proven route of market
stimulation success: securitization. The three most suitable options for
securitization include (1) creating a green Asset-Backed Security (“ABS”) in
the model of securitized mortgages; (2) developing a renewable energy Real
Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”); and (3) opening Master Limited
Partnerships (“MLP”) to renewable energy projects. Not only are investors
familiar with these investment structures, ABSs, REITs, and MLPs have
track records of success in providing consistent returns, enhanced liquidity,
and reduction in financing costs.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the inefficiencies of
the government’s current commitment to renewable energy, 1 particularly
with respect to its reliance on the tax code for providing growth incentives.
In Part II, I present a brief history of securitization theory. Part III considers
what securitization means for today’s renewable energy markets and how
ABSs, REITs, and MLPs can help to promote renewable energy financing. I
conclude by urging lawmakers to choose one of these proven tools to
promote energy independence and reduce carbon emissions in the United
States.

1. Throughout this Article, when discussing renewable energy, I am referring to solar and
wind projects primarily because of the volume of their transactions and widespread
dependence on tax equity investors, although certain other types of projects, if financing is
similar, may also apply. When I use the term renewable energy project or development, I am
referring to existing implementation technologies accompanied by power purchase
agreements.
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I. WE CAN DO BETTER: THE CURRENT STATE OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY FINANCING
A. Overview of Renewable Energy Financing
Currently, the most utilized types of project financing are not per se
deficient and, in fact, have a great number of benefits for a diverse array of
projects. They simply do not, alone or in combination, adequately support
renewable energy projects. There are four types of financing that a
renewable energy project will use, either exclusively or in some combination:
(1) tax equity funding; (2) project finance debt; (3) grants; and (4) non-tax
equity funding.2
Tax equity financing involves a passive ownership interest from a large
financial institution in the renewable energy development “where [the]
investor receives a return based not only on cash flow from the asset or
project but also on federal and state income tax benefits.”3 Tax equity
financing effectively allocates the incentive tax breaks to the investors who,
unlike the developers, have the appropriate “passive” profits to use them.4
These passive profits are vital, as tax credits can offset only passive income.5
Passive income typically means that the investor is not involved in the dayto-day operations. 6 Investors may also receive a share of the project’s
revenues or an equity ownership portion in the project.7
Two tax equity financing structures are currently in use: flip partnerships
and sale-leaseback models.8 In the flip partnership model, the tax equity
investor, which is usually the most significant capital contributor, combines
with the developer to form a partnership or limited liability company for tax
purposes.9 The partnership has near complete ownership of the development
until a predetermined circumstance “flips” the ownership to the project
2. Jeffrey Sun, Financing for Solar Deals in the U.S., ACORE 5 (May 2012),
http://www.acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Jeffrey-Sun.pdf.
3. Jack Cargas, U.S. Renewable Energy Tax Equity Investment and the Treasury Cash
Grant Program, U.S. PREF 1 (Dec. 2011), http://reffwallstreet.com/us-pref/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/RE-Tax-Equity-v2.1.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Mark Bolinger, Revealing the Hidden Value that the Federal Investment Tax Credit
and Treasury Cash Grant Provide to Community Wind Projects, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L
LAB. 15 (Jan. 2010), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-2909e.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 16.
8. David Miller & Daniel Mulcahy, Investment in Alternative Energy After the End of
Cash Grants, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP 1 (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.
cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/investment-in-alternative-energy-after-theend-of-cash-grants.
9. Id.
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developer.10 These agreements, with durations of five or ten years, are
drafted to maximize usage of capital and tax credits.11 Sale leasebacks
involve a renewable energy project developer selling the project’s assets to a
tax equity investor, who then leases them back to the developer while
agreeing to be responsible for the operating expenses.12 Deciding between
the flip partnership and the sale leaseback depends on “the type of credits,
the nature of the renewable energy property, the cost of the property, the
projected energy production and sales from the facility, the equity investor’s
tax capacity and available debt structures.”13 Tax equity financing “has been
the bedrock of renewable energy power for a decade,”14 and is discussed in
greater depth in Part I.D.
Generally, project finance is a borrowing structure described as the
“financing of long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public services
based upon a non-recourse or limited recourse financial structure, where
project debt and equity used to finance the project are paid back from the
cash flow generated by the project.”15 The most common benefits of project
finance are: “(i) the non-recourse nature of the debt; (ii) the ability of the
project's sponsors to maximize their equity leverage while maximizing any
tax benefits; and (iii) the ability to provide off-balance sheet treatment.”16 In
the renewable energy context, the loan is made to a Special Purpose Vehicle
(“SPV”), whose sole business is building, owning, and operating the specific
project.17 Renewable energy developers use project finance to build their
infrastructure before they can utilize the benefits of the tax credits.18 Project
finance structures are typically used in conjunction with a tax equity investor,
who also provides funding to the SPV.19
Cash grants are a form of government funding and likely the most
favorable financing source from the developer’s perspective, although they
are in short supply. Section 1603 of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (AARA) of 200920 was the primary grant available for
supplementing renewable energy project financing and has a stated purpose
10. Peter Vidani, Tax Equity for Renewables, Wind: Historical Trends and Projections
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://forrestthroughthetrees.tumblr.com/post/14892768599/tax-equity-forrenewables-wind-historical-trends-and.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Miller & Mulcahy, supra note 8, at 5.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Katharine C. Baragona, Project Finance, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 139, 140 (2004).
16. Id.
17. Sun, supra note 2, at 6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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of “reimburs[ing] eligible applicants for a portion of the cost of installing
specified energy property used in a trade or business or for the production of
income.” 21 The cash grant, which expired in 2012, was provided to
commercial and utility solar developers in place of tax credits (specifically
investment tax credits),22 and thus was a mechanism for helping developers
to avoid the difficulties of tax equity investor-dependence.23 In the short
time it was in existence, the Section 1603 program awarded $11.6 billion to
almost 38,000 projects in all 50 states, supporting $38.6 billion in total
investments.24 While both the cash grant and the ITC represent thirty percent
of the total cost of the project, Section 1603 had the appeal of giving the
recipient cash regardless of whether the project was profitable enough to pay
taxes during the installation year. 25
Unfortunately, and perhaps
unsurprisingly given the theme of U.S. renewable energy commitment, it fell
victim to politics and was not renewed in 2012.26 And so the dependence on
tax equity partnerships continues.
Non-tax equity funding, or sponsor loans, can help to fill any “gaps” left
by the previous three mechanisms.27 However, this source has its own set of
difficulties and limitations, most notably the high cost of financing or a
requirement of equity ownership, which often results in unavailability to the
developer.
Let us look at a hypothetical solar developer’s project as an example of
how the funding and development process works. An individual, perhaps a
homeowner or business seeking to install rooftop solar cells, leases the solar
equipment from a solar developer and signs a power-purchase-agreement
(PPA) with the solar developer to receive electricity for a set duration,
usually at or below market price.28 Essentially, the individual homeowner or
21. Recovery Act, 1603 Program: Payments for Specified Energy Property in Lieu of Tax
Credits, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/
1603.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
22. Sun, supra note 2, at 5.
23. Cargas, supra note 3, at 1.
24. Michael Mendelsohn & John Harper, §1603 Treasury Grant Expiration: Industry
Insight on Financing and Market Implications, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 22 (June
2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/53720.pdf.
25. Tor Valenza, Why the 1603 Treasury Grant Program Matters to Solar and RE,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/blog/post/2012/03/26-senators-go-on-the-record-we-dont-support-solar-jobs-or-anyrenewable-energy-jobs.
26. Cheryl Kaften, U.S. Congress “Pulls the Plug” on Section 1603 Treasury Program,
PV MAG. (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/us-congress-pullsthe-plug-on-section-1603-treasury-program_100005372/#axzz2hS31n2Og.
27. Sun, supra note 2, at 5.
28. See Green Power Partnership: Solar Power Purchase Agreements, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/solarpower.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2013)
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business owner is buying the services produced by the solar cells, as opposed
to the solar cells themselves. The installation is appealing to the individual
because of the little capital required,29 the competitive energy rates provided,
and the satisfaction of consuming clean energy. The solar developer
ultimately benefits from the income stream generated from the lease and the
PPA, as well as the tax incentives in place and any applicable renewable
energy credits.30 A tax equity investor will likely partner with the solar
developer to form an SPV, which will “function as the legal entity that
receives and distributes to the investor payments from the sale of the systems
kWh output and tax benefits.”31 Of course, if the solar developer does not
locate enough funding through the various channels previously discussed,
then it cannot purchase the solar cells to lease to the individual.
B. The Renewable Energy Handicap
By comparison, renewable energy has not received the same subsidy
support as oil, coal, or natural gas and is, in a sense, handicapped when
compared to other types of energy. Before I discuss the deficiencies of the
specific tax incentive policies that are in place to promote renewable energy
growth, it is worth noting that, simply on a level of scale, the commitment in
the U.S. to non-renewable energy dwarfs that of its support of renewables.
Any discussion of the failure of renewable energy to stand on its own two
feet after years of assistance should be considered in light of the incredible
welfare given to fossil fuel generation. While the U.S. prides itself on the
promotion of free-market enterprise and unfettered capitalism, the national
energy market has evolved into the very structure we denounce—that of a
Botoxed, buoyed, and rigged industry where risk is swallowed by the
taxpayers. Adding new product sources to this industry becomes incredibly
difficult. The playing field is tilted against any new energy source, and in
particular, renewable energy sources.
In a recent study conducted by Nancy Pfund, Managing Partner at DBL
Investors, and Ben Healey, a graduate student at Yale University School of
Management and School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, oil and gas
industries were found to have an average annual support of $4.9 billion (from
1918 to 2009) and nuclear received $3.5 billion (from 1947 to 1999), while

[hereinafter Green Power Partnership].
29. See Solar Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), ONE BLOCK OFF THE GRID,
http://solarfinancing.1bog.org/solar-power-ppas-power-purchase-agreements/ (last visited
Dec. 6, 2013) (discussing the “no-to-low money down” typically required for PPAs).
30. See Green Power Partnership, supra note 28.
31. Id.
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renewable support was just $0.4 billion (from 1994 to 2009).32 Aggregated
over these time periods, total support for oil and gas industries totaled $447
billion compared to just $5.9 billion over the much shorter period.33 Perhaps
more telling is the government support in the early industry stages. Looking
at first fifteen years of subsidy life, oil and gas industry received average
annual support of $1.8 billion, nuclear received $3.3 billion per year, and
renewables averaged just $0.4 billion.34 Additionally, federal protections like
the Price-Anderson Act provide enormous indemnification benefits to
nuclear power plants,35 effectively minimizing the majority of investment
risk in arguably the riskiest energy market.
The tax incentives and other protections implemented for nuclear and oil
and gas were established to, arguably, help the industry expand when it was,
at the time, too small to be competitive itself.36 Energy markets are unique in
that they require an incredible amount of infrastructure to survive; economies
of scale play a significantly larger role in infrastructure-dependent industries
than they do elsewhere.37 Subsequently, renewable energy support should be
increased or, at the very least, become a consistent policy commitment upon
which investors can rely as the renewable energy infrastructure expands and
the energy market playing field is leveled.
C. Risk Born from Short-Term Commitments
The federal government’s inconsistent commitment to renewable energy
growth is the largest risk factor investors consider when evaluating a
potential solar or wind investment. The threat of expiring tax credits is
enough to deter any reasonable investor, tax equity or otherwise.
Dependence on Congress, which holds the key to renewal of these incentives,
scares away any consistent and sizeable investor base that might provide
support to a project that is dependent on these credits.
The Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC), established by the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, authorizes Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a ten-year production tax credit for certain renewable energy
projects, including: wind, biomass, geothermal, landfill gas, municipal solid

32. Nancy Pfund & Ben Healey, What Would Jefferson Do? The Historical Role of
Federal Subsidies in Shaping America’s Energy Future, DBL INVESTORS 29 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.dblinvestors.com/documents/What-Would-Jefferson-Do-Final-Version.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Taylor Meehan, Lessons from the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity Act for
Future Clean Energy Compensation Models, 18 CONN. INS. L. J. 339, 343–49 (2011).
36. See Pfund & Healey, supra note 32, at 6.
37. Id. at 34.
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waste, qualified hydropower, and marine and hydrokinetic facilities.38 Wind
energy has benefitted more than any other energy group from this tax credit
and, largely due to the PTC, the U.S. has become a world leader in wind
power installation.39 Specifically, the PTC provides a subsidy of 2.2 cents
per kilowatt hour to producers of electricity from wind turbines. 40
Unfortunately, the PTC is short-term in its legislative design and has to be
renewed every one to two years.41 Lawmakers scrambled to renew the PTC
in 2013, highlighting the industry’s job creation.
While 37,000 jobs depend on the wind industry, a one-year extension of
the PTC costs taxpayers $12 billion.42 In 1999, 2001, and 2003—years in
which the subsidies faced non-renewal—U.S. new wind capacity decreased
by over seventy-five percent from each prior year, and similar uncertainty
based financing shortfalls have occurred in the solar development market.43
This uncertainty has led to “boom and bust cycles in renewable energy
development, under-investment in manufacturing capacity in the U.S., and
variability in equipment and supply costs.”44
Section 48 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a Federal Investment
Tax Credit (ITC) for certain commercial energy projects, including solar,
fuel cells, small wind projects, geothermal, microturbines, and combined heat
and power projects.45 The solar projects, as well as the fuel cell projects, are
eligible for a federal income tax reduction equal to thirty percent of the
project’s qualifying costs.46 In 2009, President Obama’s stimulus package
permitted PTC-eligible projects to elect ITC benefits and ITC-eligible
projects to elect a cash grant of equal value.47
Even Congress’s efforts to alleviate tax equity dependency through the
Section 1603 grant were short-lived.48 Despite supporting roughly 50,000 to
70,000 direct and indirect jobs between 2009 and 2011 and producing $26
38. Mark Bolinger et al., PTC, ITC, or Cash Grant? An Analysis of the Choice Facing
Renewable Power Projects in the United States, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 1 (Mar.
2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45359.pdf [hereinafter Bolinger et al.].
39. Ryan Wiser, Mark Bolinger & Galen Barbose, Using the Federal Production Tax
Credit to Build a Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States, LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB. 1 (Nov. 2007), http://eetd.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/publications/report-lbnl-63583.pdf.
40. Steve Goreham, A Subsidy That’s Blowin’ in the Wind, WASH. TIMES CMNTYS. (Nov.
26, 2012), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/climatismwatching-climate-science/2012/nov/26/subsidy-s-blowin-wind/.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Cargas, supra note 3, at 1–2.
44. Pfund & Healey, supra note 32, at 27.
45. Bolinger et al., supra note 38, at 1.
46. Goreham, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. See supra Part I.A.
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billion to $44 billion in economic output against $9.6 billion in expenditure,49
the cash grant expired in October 2012.
There are no financial innovations that can alleviate the risk deterrence
involved with an uncommitted government. And without the infrastructure
in place, renewable energy cannot compete with existing technology, most of
which was or still is heavily subsidized by the federal government.
D. There Are Only So Many Tax Equity Players
Renewable energy developers’ dependency on tax equity investors is,
along with insufficient and inconsistent government support, the largest
impediment to renewable energy funding growth. Renewable energy’s
reliance on tax credits has been accurately described as “handcuffing” the
entire industry.50 The government’s reliance on the tax code to promote
renewable energy projects is poorly constructed, limits the potential investor
pool, drives up financing costs, and subsequently restricts renewable energy
growth. Supply of capital, not demand of financing, is the issue. As Marshal
Salant, managing director of Citigroup Global Markets Inc., recently said,
“[t]here’s more demand for tax equity to finance renewable energy projects
than we will ever have in the way of supply.”51
As I have previously discussed, renewable energy developers must
partner with tax equity investors to take advantage of the tax credits
incentives in place.52 Tax equity investors are usually large financial entities,
such as banks, insurance companies, or utility affiliates. 53 These
sophisticated investors use the PTC and the ITC to offset passive income tax
liabilities. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in an effort to prevent
wealthy individuals from creating more tax shelters, dictates that if an
individual earns tax credits from investments that he does not “materially
participate in” (such as investing in a wind or solar farm), then he can only
49. Daniel Steinberg, Gian Porro & Marshall Goldberg, Prelminary Analysis of the Jobs
and Economic Impacts of Renewable Energy Projects Supported by the §1603 Treasury Grant
Program, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 16 (Apr. 2012) http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy12osti/52739.pdf. See also Lisa Linowes, Section 1603 Grant Extension: Just Say No,
MASTERRESOURCE (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.masterresource.org/2011/12/section-1603extension-no/.
50. John Farrell, Federal Tax Credits Handcuff Clean Energy Development, INST. FOR
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.ilsr.org/federal-tax-credits-handcuff-cleanenergy-development/.
51. Andrew Herndon, Clean-Energy Funding to Drop After Obama Grant Ends,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-30/cleanenergy-funding-to-drop-after-obama-grant-program-ends.html.
52. See supra Part I.A.
53. Cargas, supra note 3, at 1.
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utilize those credits to offset taxes that he pays on the same kind of income
(such as renting property).54 Both activities are considered passive. Since
few Americans have sizeable passive income, few Americans can effectively
invest in renewable energy projects.55 As a result, the potential investor pool
in renewable energy projects is incredibly limited.
According to the NREL, the present framework of tax incentives and tax
equity financing dependence limits the pool of investors to a select few
financial institutions and others who: (1) have a substantial current and future
tax liability; (2) have the financial acumen to engage in a complex project
structure; (3) are willing to hold their ownership interests in the projects for
several years; (4) are able to invest in illiquid assets; (5) are willing to invest
in non-core assets rather than the firm’s primary mission, debt reduction,
shareholder dividends, or retaining cash for a contingency; (6) are
sufficiently sophisticated to account for a shifting tax policy environment in
their investment decisions; and (7) are comfortable with modest returns
generally earned by tax equity.56
These desired characteristics result in a small investor pool. Between
2008 and 2009, the number of tax equity investors shrunk from roughly
twenty to eight or nine due to the financial crisis.57 This number has since
risen to twenty-two. 58 According to a survey carried out by the U.S.
Partnership for Renewable Energy Finance, just $3.6 billion of tax equity
financing would be available for renewable energy projects in 2012.59 The
tax equity market typically contracts and expands with accounting
profitability and the desire for companies to offset taxable gains and income
in any given year.60
Tax equity transactions are also incredibly expensive which, in turn,
drives up the project financing costs. Tax equity partners often demand a

54. John Farrell, Why “Passive Activities” May Be Clean Energy’s Biggest Hurdle, INST.
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ilsr.org/passive-activities-cleanenergys-biggest-hurdle/ [hereinafter Farrell, Passive Activities].
55. Id.
56. Mendelsohn & Harper, supra note 24, at 9. Unlike most corporations, financial
companies are highly leveraged, which increases the value of the tax equity investment. Id.
57. Bolinger et al., supra note 38, at 10.
58. State of the Tax Equity Market, CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP 2 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/27976b63-2445-4b3d-b0615de6bd8ff546/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e345e7fc-b5e9-4d15-97715fff15df4921/
StateofTaxEquity_Mar12.pdf.
59. Solar Energy Securitization on the Horizon as Industry Players Look for New Finance
Vehicles, CLEANTECHNICA (May 18, 2012), http://cleantechnica.com/2012/05/18/solar-energysecuritization-on-the-horizon-as-industry-players-look-for-new-finance-vehicles/ [hereinafter
CLEANTECHNICA].
60. Id.
FOR
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thirty percent return on their equity, if not more.61 The cost of structuring a
tax equity deal is estimated at a minimum of $400,000, which pushes up the
desired project-size to become cost-effective for the tax equity investor.62
Because of this necessary scale, projects under $30 million are not desirable
to tax equity investors.63 This equates to a higher startup cost to solar
projects, due solely to the difficulties of project financing and entirely
independent of the actual cost of producing electricity. If these costs were
lowered (and they likely can be with market liquidity), renewable energy
output would be better positioned for access to capital and significant
growth.
Additionally, local ownership of renewable energy projects—e.g., local
ownership in the form of cooperatives, schools, or cities—is limited by a
dependence on tax credits because the incentives are available only for
taxable entities.64 By limiting this investor pool to tax equity investors, a
large population of investors is excluded, most notably tax-exempt pension
funds and retail investors.65
Pension funds, in particular, could be a boon to renewable energy
financing. These funds account for $33.3 trillion in the U.S. investment
marketplace alone, and even more abroad.66 Pension funds’ appetites for
renewable energy may go beyond simple diversification: socially responsible
investment funds (SRIs), which incorporate societal goals and ethics along
with their mission of investment returns, are on the rise, and now represent
almost $4 trillion in potential capital alone.67 SRI pension fund exposure to
renewable energy projects is surprisingly low—less than one percent—due,
in large part, to lack of liquidity and appropriate investment vehicles.68
Additionally, the dependency on tax equity and institutional investors
limits the opportunities for small to mid-size developments because these
61. John
Farrell,
Could
Securitization
Democratize
Solar
Power?,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (July 23, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/
blog/post/2012/07/could-securitization-democratize-solar-power.
62. Ian R. Miller, Barriers to Tax Equity Syndication for Solar Development, ACORE 7–8
(Spring 2012), http://www.acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Tax-Equity-Barriers.
IanMiller.InternSpring2012.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Farrell, Passive Activities, supra note 54.
65. Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Op-Ed., How to Make Renewable Energy
Competitive, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/opinion/how-tomake-renewable-energy-competitive.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
66. SRI Basics, U.S. SIF, http://www.ussif.org/content.asp?contentid=37 (last visited Dec.
6, 2013).
67. Id.
68. Raffaele Della Croce et al., The Role of Pension Funds in Financing Green Growth
Initiatives, OECD 6 (Sept. 2011), http://www.climatebonds.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
OECD_Role_of_PFs_in_Financing_GreenGrowth-WP10.pdf.
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financial players typically have high minimum investment standards that
block all but the largest developments. 69 Bundling these developments
through securitization, however, would not only achieve reaching new
investor pools, but would also help to provide greater access to capital for the
mid- and small-sized developments.70
Poor design has limited the potential for renewable energy funding
growth. Proven financial innovation tools, such as securitization, are
available to reduce the tax equity-dependency and democratize investment
opportunities in renewable energy projects.
II. SECURITIZATION THEORY
In order to understand how securitization tools can help to stimulate
renewable energy funding, an overview of securitization theory is necessary.
Despite its derivatives being the creation of would-be rocket scientists turned
Wall Street financiers, securitization, in its simplest form, means the pooling
of assets into one security and marketing it to investors. It involves taking a
single financial cash flow producing asset, such as a loan, pooling it together
with other similar assets based on statistical analysis of criteria including
leaseholders’ credit quality and the geographic distribution of leases,71 and
selling the package of pooled assets to an investor. The act of securitization
is considered by some to be the most important financial innovation of the
last part of the twentieth century. 72 It has gone from innovation to a
mainstream financing vehicle in the last twenty to thirty years.73
Securitization is attractive because of its benefits to borrowers, lenders,
and investors. Securitization allows banks and non-financial institutions to
obtain liquidity from assets that are otherwise illiquid.74 Ultimately, this
lowers the total risk of each lender, which, in turn, allows each lender to
hypothetically secure more similar loans from the reduced risk and the new
funds received from the sale of that particular asset. Additionally, because
lenders are typically vertically integrated, they often duplicate services;
securitization “tends to increase the number of specialized participants
competing at various stages of the lending and funding process and

69. Paul Schwabe et al., Mobilizing Public Markets to Finance Renewable Energy
Projects: Insights from Expert Stakeholders, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 3 (June 2012),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55021.pdf.
70. Id.
71. CLEANTECHNICA, supra note 59.
72. See Alfredo Martín-Oliver & Jesus Santana, Why Do Banks Securitize Assets?, FIN.
INNOVATION 2 (Nov. 2007), http://www.finance-innovation.org/risk08/files/3433996.pdf.
73. CLEANTECHNICA, supra note 59.
74. Martín-Oliver & Santana, supra note 72, at 2.
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encourages new entrants and price and product competition,”75 which helps
to drive down financing costs for the borrower.
In the real estate mortgage world, an investor is unlikely to purchase a
security that guarantees just the mortgage payments for one homeowner.
However, if you package thousands of homeowners’ mortgages, the risk of
default is spread amongst the pool, making it more appetizing for an
investor.76
Securitization provides asset diversification for the investor, both within
and across asset classes, while also permitting bank intermediaries to free up
capital on their balance sheets. Rather than holding the financial assets to
maturity, the lenders can offload them by selling them to investors. 77
Securitization also places the burden of credit risk assessment on the bond
buyers, which is typically done through the major U.S. credit rating agencies,
the very agencies that enabled the subprime market to grow and then
spectacularly implode.78
Securitization, or more generally, structured finance, first began to
appear in the 1970s.79 Fannie Mae was created in 1938 following the real
estate collapse during the Great Depression to purchase mortgages when
funds are not available and to sell mortgages when funds are abundant to
provide liquidity for the mortgage market.80 In 1968, Congress split Fannie
Mae into two entities: a redesigned Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae.81 Ginnie
Mae was designed to purchase nonconventional insured mortgages.82 The
new Fannie Mae became a federally chartered corporation that bought
conventional home mortgages from private lenders, the hope being that this
new private entity would provide a “low-cost source of funds for lenders
wishing to offer conventional, non-governmental insured mortgages.” 83
Ginnie Mae, whose current mission is to expand affordable housing by
“linking global capital markets to the nation's housing markets,” 84 was
75. LEON KENDALL, A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 12–13 (1996).
76. Michael Mendelsohn, Securitization: A Dirty Word, or a New Opportunity for
Renewable Energy, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Nov. 28, 2011, 4:32 PM),
https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/securitization-and-secondary-markets-renewableenergy [hereinafter Mendelsohn, Dirty Word].
77. CLEANTECHNICA, supra note 59.
78. Id.
79. Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 607, 608 (1990).
80. Id.
81. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2198 (2007).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), GINNIE MAE, http://www.ginniemae.gov/Pages/
faq.aspx?cat=Consumer%20Education&subcat=Ginnie%20Mae%20&pagestart=1 (last visited
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initially created to purchase the unconventional government insured loans.85
Shortly after its creation, however, Ginnie Mae engaged in the first largescale structured finance, or what we know today as securitization.86 This
entity was responsible for the first structured finance innovations, trading
“pass-through” mortgage securities in which the investor purchased a
fractional undivided interest in an aggregated pool of mortgage loans and, in
return, received a share of the interest income generated by the aggregated
loans.87 As the originator, mortgage lenders would aggregate the pools of
loans that had similar characteristics (e.g., quality, term, and interest rate).88
After the pool was placed in a trust, certificates of ownership were sold to
investors, either through a government agency, private conduit, or direct
placement.89 Investors would then receive the income from these pooled
loans.90 Freddie Mac, which was created in 1970, served a similar function
as Fannie Mae.91
These new pass-through investment vehicles permitted investors to
possess a diversified share of a large number of securities insured by the
government (through Ginnie Mae) or guaranteed by the Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as Government-Sponsored-Enterprises (GSEs). 92 Investors
viewed these packaged securities as low risk investments because of the GSE
backstop. 93 Ultimately, this innovation permitted the capital markets to
“directly invest in American home ownership at a lower cost than the older
depository lending model of business.”94
According to structured finance scholar Leon Kendall, there are seven
basic requirements of successful securitization programs: (1) standardized
contracts; (2) grading of risk though underwriting; (3) database of historic
statistics; (4) standardization of applicable laws; (5) standardization of
servicer quality; (6) reliable supply of quality credit enhancers; and (7)
computers to handle complexity of analysis.95
There is no secondary market for renewable energy projects as there is
for auto loans, home mortgages, student loans, or even credit cards.96 As a
Dec. 6, 2013).
85. Peterson, supra note 81, at 2198.
86. Id.
87. Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 609.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Peterson, supra note 81, at 2198.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2198–99.
94. Id.
95. KENDALL, supra note 75, at 7.
96. Mendelsohn, Dirty Word, supra note 76.
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result, the required returns of renewable energy investments stay private,
“making it impossible to comparison shop.” 97 Additionally, investors,
lenders, and borrowers suffer due to illiquid markets, high financing costs,
reduced availability of capital, and limited investor choice and opportunity.98
III. RENEWABLE ENERGY SECURITIZED
The consistent payment structure of power purchase agreements and
solar leases makes these obligations attractive for securitization. In the
renewable energy markets, “securitized debt has the potential to provide
better pricing and a longer tenor than bank loans.”99 Institutional investors
and everyday Americans invest in mutual funds comprised of stocks and
bonds without much concern. Investing in a solar security is also a low-risk,
low-reward instrument. As one solar installation company owner has said,
“[t]he economy is full of people who have too much money and those that
don’t have enough. The securitization fixes an enormous inefficiency.”100
While the number of securitization issues has decreased across all asset
classes following the credit crisis, interest in unique or esoteric asset classes,
which would include solar equipment and related power purchase agreements
or lease receivables, has increased due to the higher yields attached to such
asset classes.101 Securitization “also offers the ability for a sponsor, by ‘ring
fencing’ the solar assets in a separate limited-purpose debt-issuing entity, to
obtain financing through bonds that are rated higher than its own credit rating
as an operating company.”102
All three proposals described below—a green ABS, REITs, and MLPs—
would benefit from the same industry features to increase transparency and
reduce risk. First, standardization of transactions and contractual forms
would make a large impact in risk assessment. Various PPA forms and
regulatory structures at the federal, state, and local level create a maze of
potential risk from the investor’s perspective.
Additionally, once
standardized, the longer the duration of the PPA, the longer the duration of
the income stream and, thus, the more desirable that particular asset will be
97. Id.
98. See id. at 13 (discussing the benefits for consumer-borrowers, originators, investors,
and Wall Street).
99. Jeffrey Chester et al., Financing Renewable Energy Projects and the Potential for
Securitization, KAYE SCHOLER LLP 3 (June 2011), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/
publications/20111031/_res/id=sa_File1/chester_fellerhoff_tan_10312011.pdf.
100. Steve Hargreaves, Selling the Solar-Backed Security, CNNMONEY (May 25, 2011,
11:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/25/news/companies/solar_backed_security/
index.htm.
101. Chester et al., supra note 99, at 3.
102. Id.
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to securitization. Regulatory standardization between states and the federal
government would also help to streamline the risk assessment and,
ultimately, the security transaction. Historical data of the income and default
risk from those individual transactions will also be useful as investors and
ratings agencies evaluate the packaged security. Ratings agencies can take
the initiative in providing the due diligence that investors may not be able, or
willing, to do.103 And of course, decreased dependency on uncertain tax
credits will help to reduce risk. Assuming these credits stay in place, reduced
dependency will happen through increased funding, hopefully achieved
through securitization and the ultimate expansion of renewable energy
infrastructure.
Part III analyzes in some depth the three initiatives that should be
pursued to effectively bridge the renewable energy markets with the capital
markets through securitization: green ABSs, REITs, and green MLPs.
A. Green Asset-Backed Securities
A green asset-backed security would be formed similarly to the mortgage
ABS described above and facilitated by the GSEs, but would be a structured
financial compiled from the income streams from renewable energy
equipment leases or power purchase agreements. The solar market, for
example, is ripe for pure securitization in the asset-backed security model. It
“has matured over the last few years and there are now originators or
developers in the distributed generation sector with a track record and proven
ability to originate transactions with customers in both residential and
commercial.”104 These developers typically install and service equipment,
entering into long-term power purchase agreements with customers.105 The
equipment leases tend to be long-term leases with regularly scheduled rent
payments.106 “A portfolio of such leases and/or power purchase contracts
can provide a potential issuer with a steady and diversified stream of cash
flows to provide collateral support and service payments under the
securitized debt.” 107 Additionally, the volume of transactions, with the
increasing use of standardized contracts, creates a more diversified and
commoditized pool of assets that can be analyzed on a portfolio basis as
opposed to asset-by-asset.108 These analyses will provide rating agencies
with historical performance data, a crucial component to the ratings process
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Schwabe et al., supra note 69, at 2–4.
Chester et al., supra note 99, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and the marketability of the security. 109 Furthermore, the solar panels
themselves are commoditized units that are readily available and replaceable
in the event of loss or technical failure. 110 If used as collateral in
securitization, the solar panels would accordingly have more readily
determinable or predictable liquidation values as well.111
Let us take a look at how securitization would affect solar installations
and how a green asset-backed security would be formed. A residential solar
developer may have 10,000 signed leases, each paying a fixed amount for
their electricity every month.112 Securitization of these leases would have
three immediate benefits to the renewable energy industry. First, the solar
developer could sell those leases to a pension fund or retail investor,
recapitalize, and then provide, assuming adequate demand, additional leases
to customers looking to install solar panels in their homes.113 Second, the
developer, whose backers are currently large banks acting as tax equity
financiers, could diversify its investor base and potentially reach new
investors who want to stimulate the developer’s growth. 114 Lastly,
securitizing the leases spreads the risk of default among the buyers of the
securities.115
This model is, to some extent, very close to being utilized. Companies
like SolarCity and Sungevity have robust residential solar businesses and are
considering selling solar securities in this model.116 Compiling reliable usage
and payment history will be essential to building the foundation of a liquid
and thriving green ABS market.
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), through funding
from the Department of Energy, is working to “build consensus among
industry players to standardize contracts, develop datasets to assess
performance and payment risk, and harmonize public utility commission
regulations to foster a common set of requirements across state jurisdictions
. . . [and] to enable the market to access low-cost capital through easily
tradable securities.”117 The benefits of securitization are clear, established,
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Chester et al., supra note 99, at 4.
Id.
Hargreaves, supra note 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Chris Meehan, Solar Leasing Companies May Securitize Assets,
CLEANENERGYAUTHORITY.COM (June 1, 2011), http://www.cleanenergyauthority.com/solarenergy-news/companies-consider-securitizing-solar-leases-060111/.
117. Michael Mendelsohn, How Do We Lower Solar Installation Costs and Open the
Market to Securitized Portfolios: Standardize and Harmonize, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT
FIN. (Nov. 7, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/how-do-we-lower-
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and recognized by investors.
The formation of a green GSE may help stimulate the flow of credit to
the renewable energy industry through an implied guarantee of the federal
government. 118 These GSEs would help originators package renewable
energy loans or power purchase agreements into mortgage-backed securities
by providing credit guarantees to those particular securities.119 They would
also use any available funds they raise themselves to purchase the green
ABSs.120 These actions would help to build a robust and liquid market for
green ABS. The design for this model is nothing innovative—it is the same
model used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.121
B. Real Estate Investment Trusts
REITs can provide many of the same benefits as the pure securitization,
green ABS model, but this established investment structure reaches the goals
in different ways, and needs some assistance from the IRS to succeed. This
section discusses: (1) REIT structure basics; (2) a historical overview of
REIT structure and investments; and (3) how REITs can be applied to
renewable energy.
1. REIT Structure Basics
As defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a REIT
is a “company that owns—and typically operates—income-producing real
estate or real estate-related assets.”122 If a company wishes to qualify as a
REIT, a company must: (1) pay out at least ninety percent of its taxable
income annually in the form of dividends to shareholders; (2) be an entity
that would be taxable as a corporation but for its REIT status; (3) be
managed by a board of directors or trustees; (4) have shares that are fully
transferable; (5) have a minimum of one hundred shareholders after its first
year as a REIT; (6) have no more than fifty percent of its shares held by five
or fewer individuals during the last half of the taxable year; (7) invest at least
solar-installation-costs-and-open-market-securitized-portfolios-standardize-.
118. Bradley K. Krehely, Note, Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the
Federal Subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 519, 536 (2002).
119. David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1023
(Summer 2008).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/reits.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N].
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seventy-five percent of its total assets in real estate assets and cash; (8) derive
at least seventy-five percent of its gross income from real estate related
sources, including rents from real property and interest on mortgages
financing real property; (9) derive at least ninety-five percent of its gross
income from such real estate sources and dividends or interest from any
source; and (10) have no more than twenty-five percent of its assets consist
of non-qualifying securities or stock in taxable REIT subsidiaries.123
The three primary categories of REITs are: (1) equity-based REITs, (2)
mortgage-based REITs, and (3) hybrid REITs.124 Equity REITs focus on
property ownership by owning, investing, managing, or developing.125 Its
revenue comes “primarily from income generated by rental and lease
payments” from the property.126 Some equity REITs become sector-specific,
focusing only on properties owned by certain sectors, such as healthcare.127
Mortgage-based REITs, on the other hand, specialize in financing activities
and do not own any real property.128 Essentially, mortgage REITs generate
their revenue from the interest earned on loans they make to real estate
owners.129 Equity REITs are significantly more popular than their financing
counterpart. 130 Lastly, hybrid REITs combine the equity and mortgage
structures, effectively investing in both properties and mortgages.131
Within these two core REIT types, there are three REIT structures. First,
a traditional REIT owns its assets directly.132 In an Umbrella Partnership
REIT (often referred to as an UPREIT), REIT owners combine to create an
operating partnership, issuing units of ownership.133 This structure permits
the owners to defer their capital gains taxes until the units are transferred to
common stock. 134 Lastly, a DownREIT permits the REIT to use its
partnership units to purchase property, and makes it subordinate to the REIT

123. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.856-1 (2013).
124. Jack H. McCall, A Primer on Real Estate Trusts: The Legal Basics of REITs, 2
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (2001).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Micah W. Bloomfield & Mayer Greenberg, REITs: Overview, PRAC. LAW CO. 1
(Apr. 2011), http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub1053.pdf.
128. See McCall, supra note 124, at 3.
129. Id.
130. The Basics of REITs, REIT.COM, http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITFAQs/
BasicsOfREITs.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Basics of REITs].
131. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 122.
132. Basics of REITs, supra note 130.
133. Lee A. Chilcote & Glenn Morrical, UPREIT Transactions: Understanding the Benefits
and Features, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/corporate-governance/
upreit-transactions-understanding-the-benefits-and-features.html.
134. Id.

128 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 12, No. 1

itself.135 There are also slight variations to these models such as the paperclip REIT, the paired-shared REIT, and the finite life REIT.136
From an investor’s perspective, the most common positive investment
characteristics associated with REITs are: (1) strong income and long-term
growth; (2) higher dividends than most other equity investments; (3)
liquidity, especially for those REITs traded on public exchanges; (4)
professional management benefits from the REIT owners; (5) oversight due
to the corporate structure, specifically the independent directors of the REIT;
(6) disclosure obligations which provide transparency; and (7) the general
benefits of securitization—i.e., the pooling of the real estate properties which
reduces the risk of any single one of the properties not performing.137
In 2012, there were over 1000 REITs according to the Internal Revenue
Service. 138 In terms of publicly traded entities, there were 166 REITs
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, with a combined
equity market capitalization of $579 billion.139
2. History of REIT Investments
When President Eisenhower signed the Cigar Excise Tax Extension of
1960, he also signed into law the REIT Act, 140 which permitted small
investors to aggregate their investments into a single business enterprise and
gave them access to larger and previously unavailable investment
opportunities.141 Due to early structural design inefficiencies like the legal
requirement that a REIT could only own (and not operate or manage) its
properties and the REIT’s vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations and
relative tax benefits of other investment vehicles like partnerships, the REIT
industry experienced two and a half decades of slow growth.142 REITs,
because they were initially designed to be entirely passive investment
structures, were not taxed at the corporate level, and instead, were permitted
to deduct the amount distributed as dividends to shareholders.143
135. Nilene R. Evans et al., Frequently Asked Questions About Real Estate Investment
Trusts, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 5 (2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
FAQ_REIT.pdf.
136. Id. at 6–7.
137. Reasons for REIT Investment, REIT.COM, http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITFAQs/
ReasonsForREITInvestment.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
138. Basics of REITs, supra note 130.
139. Id.
140. REIT Industry Timeline: Celebrating 50 Years of REITs and NAREIT, REIT.COM,
http://www.reit.com/timeline/timeline.php (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
141. McCall, supra note 124, at 2.
142. Id.
143. Jennifer Stonecipher, Note, From One Pocket to the Other: The Abuse of Real Estate

2014

SECURITIZING RENEWABLE ENERGY

129

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 stimulated the REIT investment industry
by limiting the benefits of other similar investment vehicles, particularly
partnerships, and repealing accelerated depreciation previously available to
real estate.144 This created a large group of real estate-oriented investors
seeking income-producing opportunities and permitted REITs to own,
manage, and operate most of their income-producing properties. 145
Following the depression in the real estate industry in the early 1990s, credit
and capital for commercial real estate dried up.146 As a result, private real
estate companies determined, somewhat accurately, that REITs were the best
vehicle to access capital for their real estate-related ventures.147
3. REITs and Renewable Energy
The connection between real estate and renewable energy is a natural
one: you need real estate, sometimes in large acreage, to produce renewable
energy, and typically, the more real estate you have, the greater your
potential renewable energy output.
Renewable energy financing can benefit from the REIT structure in four
ways, all of which are independent of tax equity financing, and may even
help renewable energy projects to reach profitability without any tax credit
assistance: (1) using existing property to build solar and renewable projects;
(2) purchasing large scale renewable projects on land used exclusively for
renewable projects, such as a solar plant or a wind farm; (3) securitizing
PPAs from homeowners and/or commercial businesses; and (4) securitizing
solar lease agreements made to homeowners and/or commercial
businesses.148 It is worth noting that the design of all of these options is not
dependent on the existence of tax credits, which may expire or fluctuate. The
investment risk and potential returns associated with the produced security,
however, will be affected, at least in part, by whatever government subsidy
exists. Perhaps the greatest benefit of all of these models could be the
application of the renewable energy managerial skills of the REIT owner to
many renewable energy projects under its limited control. Lastly, there is no
reason to believe that the ninety percent distribution requirement of REITs
Investment Trusts Deductions, 72 MO. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2007).
144. McCall, supra note 124, at 2.
145. Id.
146. The REIT Story, ECO MUNICH, http://www.reit.de/english/reit.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2013).
147. Id.
148. See generally Joshua L. Sturtevant, The S-REIT: An Investment-Driven Solution to
Solar Development Problems, GW SOLAR INST. (Dec. 2011), http://www.acore.org/author/
turner/page/29/ (proposing the creation of a solar REIT, referred to as an S-REIT by the NREL
and legal solar advocate Josh Sturtevant).
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would have any effect on renewable energy operations more than any other
type of operations.
Two IRC tax requirements limit these proposals: the income test and the
asset test. The income test requires that seventy-five percent of a REIT’s
income must come from a narrow list of approved sources,149 which usually
includes rent and excludes renewable energy. The asset test requires that
seventy-five percent of the REIT’s assets be “real property,” a definition that
excludes renewable energy projects.150 There are some exceptions in the
Internal Revenue Code that permit fifteen percent of income to come from
personal property related to real property, and it is more likely that income
from a PPA be considered personal property as opposed to real.151 Either
way, the renewable energy input is severely limited.
The first proposal, building on existing REIT-owned property, is
currently being utilized, although to a limited extent. Because REITs already
own substantial property, they can simply build renewable projects (such as
wind turbines or solar panels) on these properties as a way to increase and
diversify income.152 Certain established REITs are already doing this,153 but
more can benefit. ProLogis, for example, a publicly traded REIT that owns
more than 600 million square feet, began building solar panels on its building
rooftops.154 Rather than selling its power units to its customers, ProLogis
sells them wholesale to utility providers.155 Its efforts are, unfortunately,
limited by the tax code and REIT requirements. Because renewable energy
projects are not currently considered “real property,” a REIT cannot have
more than twenty-five percent of its assets in renewable projects, and
because renewable energy profits are likely not an approved income source,
income from renewable energy project is capped at five percent.156 If the
IRS were to permit renewable energy projects to be considered “real
property” and to include income from PPAs among the qualified sources of
income (more akin to rent), then it could swiftly enable this form of
renewable energy REIT to develop and, in turn, expand the potential
149. David Feldman et al., The Technical Qualifications for Treating Photovoltaic Assets as
Real Property by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 3
n.5 (June 2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55396.pdf.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Sturtevant, supra note 148, at 14–15.
152. Michael Mendelsohn, Tapping the Capital Markets: Are REITs Another Tool in Our
Toolbox?, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FIN. (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://financere.
nrel.gov/finance/content/capital-markets-reit-real-estate-investment-trust-renewable-energyproject-finance-prologis-KIMCO.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Feldman et al., supra note 149, at 3.
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renewable energy investor pool and reduce financing costs for renewable
energy developers.
The other three proposals are also dependent, to some degree, on the
IRS’s interpretations of the tax code. For our purposes, I will assume that the
IRS has issued a new interpretation, or amended its language to allow
payments from renewable energy leases and power purchase agreements to
satisfy the income test, and solar panels and wind turbines to satisfy its
definition of real property.
The second proposal suggests a REIT owner purchase land viable for
renewable energy development, lease it to large-scale wind or solar
developers, pool the leases together, and market them to investors as a REIT
security. This would help to alleviate issues with the income test, as the
income would be derived from rent to the renewable energy developers, but
the asset test would still not be satisfied under the current interpretations.
The third and fourth examples operate in a manner similar to the
mortgage REIT model or green ABS structure, which package thousands of
real estate mortgages. My proposed model suggests REITs purchase the
hundreds or thousands of equipment leases or PPAs from individuals and
compile them in a REIT security. Help from the tax code, in both the income
and asset definitions, is necessary here. Efforts to standardize the transaction
would be incredibly helpful to this form of REIT, as the number of individual
asset transactions held by the REIT will likely be high.
C. Green Master Limited Partnerships
Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs), like REITs, utilize securitization to
package assets and ultimately, could decrease financing costs and expand the
investor base for renewable energy investment. MLPs and REITs are similar
in their tax protections and access to the public equity markets, but while an
REIT’s core assets are real estate related, an MLP’s core assets are the
underlying operating companies that it owns.157 Additionally, REITs are
structured as corporations, while MLPs are structured as partnerships.158
This section urges legislators to consider using this proven tool to connect
renewable energy projects with this financial structure, and amending the tax
code to do so. It does so by discussing: (1) MLP structure basics; (2) a
157. See Molly F. Sherlock & Mark P. Keightley, Master Limited Partnerships: A Policy
Option for the Renewable Energy Industry, CONG. RES. SERV. 3 (June 28, 2011),
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/eyeonwashington/2011/documents/masterlmtdpartnerships.pdf.
158. See Sean Pattap, Thirst for Yield Leads Fixed-Income Investors to U.S. Equity REITs,
MLPs, COM. PROP. EXEC. (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.cpexecutive.com/newsletters/
capitalmarkets-newsletter/reitscolumn/thirst-for-yield-leads-fixed-income-investors-to-u-sequity-reits-mlps/.
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historical overview of MLP structure and investments; (3) the MLP Parity
Act; and (4) how MLPs specifically can help stimulate renewable energy
financing.
1. MLP Structure Basics
An MLP is a business structure that is taxed similar to a partnership, but
whose stock is traded similar to corporate stock on the open markets.159 The
benefits of the MLP structure are mostly tax based and essentially permit the
entity to pay only one level of tax (at the income level, avoiding corporatelevel), because the income passes through the partnership to the unit holders,
who pay according to the individual tax code.160 C-Corporations, on the
other hand, typically pay two levels of taxes (at the corporate level and the
individual level).161 Any limited partnership that produces the required level
of qualifying income pays zero entity level taxation.162 The benefits are, in
effect, that “an MLP must generate $1.54 of income for an equity holder to
have one dollar of after-tax income, although a corporation must generated
$2.20 of income for its equity holder to have one dollar after-tax income.”163
Typically, MLPs consist of one general partner, such as a corporation or
limited liability company acting as a special purpose vehicle, along with
thousands of limited partners, who are public investors and provide most of
the capital to the MLP.164 MLPs generally own and operate their business
assets through a subsidiary or operating company.165 The general partner
typically receives two percent of the annual cash flow, called an incentive
distribution right, in return for taking on certain risks in the company.166 This
fee structure is also designed to incentivize the general partner to run the
company effectively and in a way that best maximizes returns.167
Because of its ability to avoid the double-taxation problem of other
entities, MLPs are able to attract more capital at a lower cost from investors
159. Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 157, at 1.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1–2.
162. Simon Maher, Corporate and LLC Taxation Compared, LLC MADE EASY,
http://www.llc-made-easy.com/LLC-and-corporate-tax.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2013). This
statement assumes that for most corporations paying entity level tax (which is simply the tax
that the corporation pays in a similar manner to what an individual would pay), their tax
bracket is in or close to the highest marginal tax bracket for individuals, approximately thirtyfive percent. Id.
163. John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471, 472
(2005).
164. Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 157, at 2.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id.
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seeking the higher returns of limited taxation, which, in turn, corresponds to
lower financing costs for the business.168 Proponents argue that, “MLPs
could substantially reduce the cost of financing renewables, which currently
rely on the participation of the tax equity market, which primarily consists of
a small set of large investment banks.”169
Today, there are about 100 MLPs with a total market cap of over $350
billion.170 Eighty percent of the current MLP market is made up of oil and
gas companies.171 Already established energy-market stimulators, MLPs are
well positioned to embrace the renewable energy capital markets.
2. A Brief History of MLPs
MLPs were designed following the energy crisis in the 1970s as a way to
stimulate domestic energy growth.172 While the first MLP was designed in
1981,173 the modern benefits of its structure were not established until the
Revenue Act of 1987.174 This Act exempted any publicly traded partnership
that received ninety percent or more of its income from “qualifying income,”
classified by the Internal Revenue Code as interest, dividends, real property
rents, gain from the sale or disposition of real property, or “income and gains
derived from the exploration, development, mining or production,
processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil,
or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral natural resource,”
including oil and natural gas.175 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 amended the qualifying income definition to include transportation
of specific renewable and alternative fuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel.176
This language opened up the corporate structure to many new fossil fuel
companies, while specifically excluding renewable energy projects. Section
613 of the IRC requires that the qualifying energy sources be produced from
168. Id.
169. Jordan M. Collins & David J. Leiter, Congress Proposes Expanding Master Limited
Partnerships to Renewable Energy & Biofuel Projects, NAT’L L. REV. (June 18, 2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-proposes-expanding-master-limitedpartnerships-to-renewable-energy-biofuel-.
170. Mike Kapsch, MLPs: A Potential Game-Changer for Renewable Energy, INV. U (Aug.
8, 2012), http://www.investmentu.com/2012/August/renewable-energy-mlps.html.
171. Id.
172. John Joshi & Malay Bansal, The Case for Master Limited Partnerships, BREAKING
ENERGY (July 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://energy.aol.com/2011/07/20/the-case-for-masterlimited-partnerships/.
173. Goodgame, supra note 163, at 485.
174. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
175. I.R.C. §§ 7704(c)(2), (d) (2008).
176. Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 157, at 7.
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“depletable” resources.177 As previously mentioned, today the majority of
the MLP market consists of fossil fuel-related companies.
3. MLPs Applied to Renewable Energy
Expanding the definition of qualified income for MLPs to specifically
include solar and wind would help to level the playing field with fossil fuel
industries, which often take advantage of this corporate structure’s benefits.
Here is how it could work: the general partner, along with dozens or
hundreds of limited partners, would control an operating company, which
would own a number of renewable energy projects. The income from the
PPAs would be distributed out to the investors in the form of dividends each
year. The operating company could own solely solar projects, or choose to
diversify among various renewable energy projects or even among all energy
projects (creating a mix of fossil fuels and renewables). Variations among
project size would also help to diversify risk. Additionally, a single
experienced operating manager could add value by providing his or her
expertise to the owned properties. The same features that will asset any
green ABS or green REIT development—standardization of contractual
forms and transactions, historical data providing adequate risk analysis,
decreased dependency on tax credits, and due diligence initiatives of ratings
agencies—will also help to prime this market for MLP securitization.
Investors of all shapes and sizes are familiar with this structure and its
connection to the energy market, and many may view MLPs as a way to
diversify their investments into the growing renewable energy space.
Expanded investor demand, combined with a MLP structure, will help to
promote greater and cheaper financing for renewable energy projects.
4. The MLP Parity Act
In June 2012, Senators Chris Coons of Delaware and Jerry Moran of
Kansas introduced the MLP Parity Act, a bill that intends to amend Section
7704 of the tax code to enable MLPs to own and finance renewable energy
projects,178 and to take advantage of the benefits described in the previous
section. Specifically, the bill seeks to expand the definition of “qualified”
sources to include clean energy resources and infrastructure projects. 179
Energy sources explicitly included are wind, closed and open loop biomass,
177. Chris Coons, The Master Limited Partnership Parity Act, U.S. SEN. CHRISTOPHER
COONS OF DEL., http://www.coons.senate.gov/issues/master-limited-partnerships-parity-act
(last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
178. Collins & Leiter, supra note 169.
179. Id.
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geothermal, solar, municipal solid waste, hydropower, marine and
hydrokinetic, fuel cells, and combined heat and power.180 The MLP Parity
Act leaves the current MLP entity intact, and all projects currently eligible to
structure as MLPs would continue to qualify exactly as they would under
existing law. 181 The Act is just two hundred words long, 182 has been
described as bipartisan,183 and is sure to run up against oil and gas lobbying
limitations. If this legislation is passed, securitization through the MLP
structure could soon be realized, bringing an estimated $6 billion of capital
immediately into MLP renewable energy investment,184 with billions more
likely in the pipeline.
CONCLUSION
Climate change is upon us. It is tempting to feel that the need to think
beyond conventional approaches is necessary to deal with this
unconventional problem. I agree that large-scale commitment is necessary to
stimulate a large-scale response. Washington’s inconsistency, however,
which in part stems from a failure to grasp the magnitude of human effects
on climate, limits the tools to those within our comfort zone. Securitization
implementation is a proven remedy to financing difficulties, and does not
strain conventional policy or financial reasoning.
Of course, what would make securitization more appealing to investors
and banks is a concentrated and firm government commitment to renewable
energy output, and building a renewable energy infrastructure in the same
way that it did for fossil fuels. This could come in the form of cap-and-trade
policy or a national Renewable Portfolio Standard. Gridlock in Washington,
D.C., ingrained corporate welfare for energy companies, and strong lobbying
on behalf of retaining that welfare makes committed change difficult.
In 2011, the International Energy Agency estimated that $10.3 trillion
was required over the next twenty years to fund alternative energy projects
that would simply maintain the climate stabilization target of not allowing
temperatures to rise by more than two degrees Celsius.185 Given the fact that
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, H.R. 6437, 112th Cong. § 2d (2012), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6437/text.
183. Robert S. Winner, Bi-Partisan Introduction of the Master Limited Partnership Act
Seeks to Level Playing Field for Development of Renewable Energy, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/OMM092812.
184. Id.
185. John Joshi, Financing Renewable Energy – A Securitization Approach, RENEWABLE
ENERGY MAG. (June 20, 2011), http://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/article/financingrenewable-energy-ndash-a-securitization-approach.
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climate estimates have been recently revised, indicating that we may have
reached this two degree increase sooner than anticipated,186 these necessary
funding estimates are sure to increase. The securitization of renewable
energy projects—in the form of a green ABS market, REITs, and MLPs—
will be a consistent stabilizing force in renewable energy project financing,
and will help to level the energy playing field.
During the writing of this Article, experts from the Brookings Institute
and Stanford University wrote a policy proposal, urging lawmakers to permit
renewable energy financing to take advantage of MLP and REIT
structures.187 In doing so, the authors framed the need for renewable energy
financing improvement as, among other incentives, one of nationalism. They
argued that the U.S. must pursue innovation and flexibility in order to remain
competitive in the world’s race for renewables.188 I agree. The world is
thirsting for a new energy structure, one more in line with our climate goals.
Currently running in fragmented lanes, the U.S. has the demand, financial
tools, and the capital available to move our energy market to a new frontier.
All that is necessary is a slight shove to put lawmakers on the same track.

186. Tom Schueneman, Climate Change Risk Looms as Two Degree Limit Now Unlikely,
THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Dec. 6, 2012), http://theenergycollective.com/globalwarmingisreal/
153056/climate-change-risk-looms-2-degree-limit-now-unlikely.
187. See generally Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Smarter Finance for Cleaner Energy:
Open Up Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to
Renewable Energy Investment, REMAKING FEDERALISM/RENEWING THE ECONOMY (Nov.
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2174650.
188. Id. at 1–2.

